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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the conditions when a research joint venture (RJV) will involve a 
university as a research partner. We hypothesize that larger RJVs are more likely to invite a 
university to join the venture as a research partner than smaller RJVs because larger ventures are 
less likely to expect substantial additional appropriability problems to result because of the 
addition of a university partner and because the larger ventures have both a lower marginal cost 
and a higher marginal value from university R&D contributions to the ventures’ innovative 
output. We test this hypothesis using data from the COoperative REsearch (CORE) database, and 
those data confirm the hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the United States, the general role of 
universities as sources for commercial innovations and technologies has gained considerable 
attention.2 The more specific role of universities as research partners gained visibility with the 
passage of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and the related policy and 
academic emphasis on research collaboration per se. 
 
According to a recent Council on Competitiveness (1996, pp. 3–4) report: 
 
R&D partnerships hold the key to meeting the challenge of transition that our nation now 
faces. … Over the next several years, participants in the U.S. R&D enterprise will have to 
continue experimenting with different types of partnerships to respond to the economic 
constraints, competitive pressures and technological demands that are forcing 
adjustments across the board … [and in response] industry is increasingly relying on 
partnerships with universities … 
 
And, according to Morgan (1998), universities are seeking such partnerships at an increasing 
rate. 
A university has a financial incentive to partner with industry in its applied research, especially if 
commercial technologies are expected to result. Industry has a research efficiency incentive to 
partner with a university. Efficiencies are gained through access to complementary activities and 
research results, and access to key university personnel (faculty and graduating students).3 As 
Rosenberg and Nelson (1994, p. 340) note: 
 
What university research most often does … is to stimulate and enhance the power of 
R&D done in industry, as contrasted with providing a substitute for it. 
 
Relatedly, Hall et al. (2003, p. 490) argue: 
 
Universities are included (invited by industry) in those research projects that involve 
what we have called “new” science. Industrial research participants perceive that the 
university could provide research insight that is anticipatory of future research problems 
and could be an ombudsman anticipating and translating to all the complex nature of the 
research being undertaken. Thus, one finds universities purposively involved in projects 
that are characterized as problematic with regard to the use of basic knowledge. 
 
This paper investigates one aspect of universities as research partners, namely the conditions 
when a research collaboration, a research joint venture (RJV) in particular, will involve a 
university as a research partner. 
In Section 2, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 and related policies are discussed 
since that Act generates the data on which the analysis in this paper is based. In Section 3, we 
provide a theoretical explanation of university participation in a research joint venture. The 
explanation implies the hypothesis that the larger the joint venture the greater the likelihood that 
industry members will invite university participation in the venture, ceteris paribus. The 
hypothesis follows because larger ventures are less likely to expect substantial additional 
appropriability problems to result because of the addition of a university partner and because the 
larger ventures have both a lower marginal cost and a higher marginal value from university 
R&D contributions to the ventures’ innovative output. We test this conclusion using information 
on research joint ventures and their membership from the U.S. National Science Foundation's 
(NSF) COoperative REsearch (CORE) database, and we report and discuss our findings in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with brief summary remarks. 
 
2. Historical background on the National Cooperative Research Act of 19844 
The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Public Law 98–462, was legislated, as stated in 
the Preamble to the Act: 
 
to promote research and development, encourage innovation, stimulate trade, and make 
necessary and appropriate modifications in the operation of the antitrust laws. 
 
While the Act sets forth these objectives, it does not place them in an historical perspective. In 
the early 1980s, there was growing concern that the U.S. industrial sector was loosing its 
competitive advantage in global markets. This was explicitly noted in the Research and 
Development Joint Venture Act of 1983, HR 4043. In the Joint Research and Development Act 
of 1984, HR 5041, the supposed benefits of joint research and development were first articulated 
from a policy perspective: 
 
Joint research and development, as our foreign competitors have learned, can be 
procompetitive. It can reduce duplication, promote the efficient use of scarce technical 
personnel, and help to achieve desirable economies of scale [in R&D]. 
 
After revisions, the NCRA of 1984 was passed. 
The NCRA of 1984 created a registration process, later expanded by the National Cooperative 
Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 and the Standards Development Organization 
Advancement Act of 2004 (SDOAA), under which research joint ventures can voluntarily 
disclose their research intentions to the U.S. Department of Justice; all disclosures are made 
public in the Federal Register.5 RJVs gain two significant benefits from filing with the 
Department of Justice. One, if the venture were subjected to criminal or civil antitrust action, the 
courts would evaluate the alleged anticompetitive behavior under a rule of reason rather than 
presumptively ruling that the behavior constituted a per se violation of the antitrust law. For 
RJVs that have filed, the Act states: 
 
In any action under the antitrust laws … the conduct of any person in making or 
performing a contract to carry out a joint research and development venture shall not be 
deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, 
taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, but not limited 
to, effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research and development 
markets. 
 
And two, if the venture were found to fail a rule-of-reason analysis, it would be subject to actual 
damages rather than treble damages. 
3. Theoretical model of university participation in a research joint venture 
The ideas in Leyden and Link (1999) are important for understanding the economics of 
university participation in industrial RJVs.6 Leyden and Link emphasize that the non-industrial 
partners in an industrial RJV can provide synergies that increase expected revenues per industrial 
RJV partner, and they can also affect the costs per RJV member. University participation can 
contribute valuable research resources—equipment, facilities and personnel that increase the 
expected flow of innovations from the RJV's investments, both increasing expected per member 
revenues from the RJV and reducing per member costs because of the unique research expertise 
and laboratory resources of the university partner. 
 
On the other hand, the openness of the academic research culture—analogous to the openness of 
the federal laboratory research culture emphasized by Leyden and Link—may create difficulties 
for the industrial partners when they attempt to appropriate the returns from their research 
investments (Hall et al., 2001 and Hall et al., 2003). This is completely analogous to the Leyden 
and Link argument about federal labs creating appropriability difficulties for the RJVs they join, 
and such difficulties will be an especially important deterrent to inviting a university (or a federal 
laboratory in the Leyden and Link study) to participate in an RJV when without the university 
there would not be a significant appropriability problem. For that reason, we hypothesize that 
larger RJVs, where size is measured by the number of members, will be more likely than smaller 
RJVs to invite a university to participate as a research partner. Larger RJVs will have 
appropriability problems anyway because with more members it is more likely that proprietary 
information will leak to outsiders or be used opportunistically by some members at the expense 
of other members. Adding a university may not cost much in terms of additional appropriability 
problems for a large RJV. Whatever synergy or cost gains are to be had can be enjoyed without 
the appropriability concern that a smaller RJV would have about significant effects of university 
participation on the RJV's ability to appropriate returns on its investments. 
 
In addition to an advantage for large ventures because of less concern about appropriability 
problems, ceteris paribus, that university participation causes, Leyden and Link (1999) discuss 
synergy and cost effects from the participation of a non-industrial partner in a venture. The ideas 
in Kohn and Scott (1982) are also useful for understanding why university participation in an 
industrial RJV is more likely when the RJV is large.7Kohn and Scott (1982) explain how 
organizational size is linked with R&D activity. Their ideas imply that larger RJVs are more 
likely than smaller ones to find university participation worthwhile and to invite a university to 
join the RJV, when the marginal cost of university R&D-output contributions decreases steeply 
with venture size and when the marginal value of university R&D-output contributions increases 
sharply with venture size. Both of these conditions are likely to hold. Marginal venture-related 
university R&D-output costs decrease with venture size given the high overhead costs associated 
with university research and the greater volume of research output anticipated for the larger 
ventures. The marginal value of the university R&D-output contributions is expected to increase 
with venture size because ventures with more participants are more likely to find useful 
applications for the venture's research output and because they are more likely to have the 
marketing and distribution channels necessary to exploit quickly the innovative outputs of the 
venture. Thus, not only the appropriability argument supports the expectation that larger RJVs 
are more likely to invite university participation, but the expectations about synergies and costs 
support that hypothesis as well. 
 
Eq. (1) summarizes our model for estimating the impact of RJV size—measured as the number 
of members in the RJV—on the probability that a university will be invited to participate in the 
venture. 
Equation 1 
Probability (university participation in an RJV) = f(size of RJV, X) 
where vector X controls for the public good nature of the RJV's research activities, unique 
characteristics of the RJV's membership, the technology characteristics of the research, time 
controls and industry controls. 
We hypothesize, ceteris paribus, that the size of the RJV is positively related to the probability of 
university participation. 
 
4. The empirical analysis 
4.1. The CORE database 
The data used to test the model in Eq. (1) come from the CORE database. The database was 
constructed under the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and is maintained under 
its auspices and with its support by Link. The resource base for the CORE database is 
information in the RJV filings registered with the Department of Justice and disclosed in the 
Federal Register. 
 
The unit of observation in the CORE database is the RJV. All public information contained in 
each new and updated filing is coded in the database, and that information is supplemented with 
other sources of information to describe the industry represented by the RJV's membership and 
technology areas and dimensions to which the venture's research relates. 
 
Through calendar year 2003, 913 RJVs have been registered with the Department of Justice and 
disclosed in the Federal Register.8 These RJVs are shown, by year of disclosure in the Federal 
Register, in Fig. 1. Certainly, the trend in RJV disclosures was upward until the mid-1990s, and 
since then it has generally declined.9 
 
Fig. 1. Number of RJVs registered with U.S. Department of Justice and disclosed in the Federal 
Register, by year of disclosure. 
 
Relevant to this paper, 14.46% of the 913 RJVs filed with the Department of Justice and publicly 
disclosed have a U.S. university as a member of the research venture. This percentage has varied 
over time, as shown in Fig. 2. Also, in the aggregate, this percentage varies by the technology 
area of the venture's research, as shown in Fig. 3.10 
 
Fig. 2. Percent of RJVs filed with U.S. Department of Justice and disclosed in the Federal 
Register with university members, by year of disclosure. 
 
Fig. 3. Percent of RJVs filed with U.S. Department of Justice and disclosed in the Federal 
Register with university members, by technology area. Note: The primary technology area 
toward which the overall research of the venture is directed: aut, factory automation; bio, 
biotechnology; che, chemicals; com, computer hardware; def, defense; enr, energy; env, 
environmental; it, information technology; man, manufacturing equipment; mat, advanced 
materials; med, medicals; pha, pharmaceuticals; pho, photonics; sof, computer software; sub, 
subassemblies and components; tam, test and measurement; tel, telecommunications; trn, 
transportation. 
4.2. The regression results 
The variables used to estimate Eq. (1) are defined in Table 1, and descriptive statistics are 
presented therein. Vector X in Eq. (1) controls for the public good nature of the RJV's research 
activities. The relevant variable is infra, which captures whether the research of the RJV is 
oriented toward infrastructure technology or not.11 Research leading to protocols or standards has 
a public good nature, and thus the output from the research lacks appropriability. On one hand, 
this variable should enter positively since the marginal cost of including a university as a 
research partner is less given the public good nature of the research. On the other hand, it could 
enter negatively since university research is basic in nature and would not be especially relevant 
to the formation of applied protocols or standards. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the variables 
Variable 
name 
n Variable description Mean Range 
univ 913 =1 if a U.S. university is a member of the RJV; 0 otherwise 0.1446 0–1 
nummemb 913 Number of members of the RJV 13.49 2–539 
infra 913 =1 if protocols, standards, or infrastructure technology is explicitly 
listed in the filing as an objective of the venture; 0 otherwise 
0.1325 0–1 
for 913 =1 if a foreign company, university, or entity is, or at some time has 
been, involved in the venture; 0 otherwise 
0.2935 0–1 
prod 913 =1 if the primary objective of the venture is product technology; 0 
otherwise 
0.3910 0–1 
proc 913 =1 if the primary objective of the venture is process technology; 0 
otherwise 
0.5170 0–1 
mixed 913 =1 if the primary objective is a mixture of process and product 
technology 
0.0920 0–1 
 Time effects 
 year 913 Annual time effects, 1985–2003 – – 
 Technology effects 
 tech 913 Primary technology area toward which the overall research of the 
venture is directed; see definitions in Fig. 3 
– – 
 
Variable 
name 
n Variable description Mean Range 
Industry effects 
 sic 884 
(913)a 
Two-digit SIC code determined by the primary SIC code of the 
dominant industry represented in the venture 
– – 
 
a For some of the RJVs a unique two-digit SIC classification could not be determined. 
Designating the “sic” for those cases as a no-unique sic code category, the no-unique category 
case is left in the intercept of the estimated models. Also, the means (and hence the proportions 
in the sample) for each of the dummy variables used to control for the industry effects, as well as 
for the time and technology effects, are not reported to save space, but they are available on 
request. 
A unique membership characteristic of the RJV's membership is captured by the variable for. On 
the one hand, the presence of a foreign firm or university could increase the probability that a 
U.S. university is invited to join the RJV if the presence of a foreign member increases the 
likelihood of productive U.S.-university aided and mediated informational spillovers. On the 
other hand, it could decrease the probability if the foreign member was invited into the RJV 
because of its unique research expertise and that expertise substitutes for that of a U.S. 
university. 
 
The technology characteristics of the venture's research are controlled for in two ways. First, we 
control for whether the primary objective of the venture is product technology (prod), process 
technology (proc), or mixed technology (mixed). We also control for the technology area of the 
overall research (technology effects) as defined in Fig. 3. 
 
And, as noted in Table 2, time controls and industry controls (based on the two-digit SIC code of 
the dominant industry represented in the venture) are considered. 
Table 2. Probit results from Eq. (1) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
nummemb 0.01837*** 
(0.00377) 
0.02085*** 
(0.00433) 
0.02063*** 
(0.00498) 
0.02111*** 
(0.00501) 
nummemb2 −0.000026*** 
(8.21e-06) 
−0.000031*** 
(9.19e-06) 
−0.000032*** 
(0.00001) 
−0.000033*** 
(0.00001) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
infra −0.17838 (0.14961) −0.21394 (0.17899) −0.26578 (0.21260) −0.27790 (0.20099) 
for −0.59886*** 
(0.15423) 
−0.62562*** 
(0.15743) 
−0.61470*** 
(0.15357) 
−0.67366*** 
(0.16599) 
prod −0.30148** 
(0.12514) 
−0.30277** 
(0.14142) 
−0.33928** 
(0.15944) 
−0.37361** 
(0.16949) 
mixed 0.15283 (0.21715) 0.06692 (0.22505) 0.01695 (0.23316) −0.00700 (0.25165) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Technology effects No No Yes Yes 
Industry effects No No No Yes 
Intercept −1.05469*** 
(0.10376) 
−1.53375*** 
(0.06947) 
−1.61243*** 
(0.23000) 
−1.55882*** 
(0.45213) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0972 0.1359 0.1641 0.1931 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
−340.57 −325.96 −313.49 −297.89 
n 913 913 899 863 
Note: Robust standard errors (and with standard errors adjusted for correlation of errors within 
each year) in parentheses. Significance levels denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). Included 
in the intercept is proc and, when appropriate, year = 1985, one technology class and one 
industry class. Also, the reduction in sample size reported in columns (3) and (4) is because of 
dropping dummy variables, and the observations set to 1 for those variables, when the variables 
predict inclusion or exclusion perfectly. 
Four sets of probit results are presented in Table 2. Those presented include a parsimonious 
specification of Eq. (1), followed by three additional specifications adding in time effects, 
technology effects, and industry effects. Our findings, based on the results in Table 2 and on 
other analyses, regarding the positive impact of RJV size on the probability of the venture 
inviting a university to join as a research partner, are robust.12 
 
Consider the results in column (4) of Table 2. Size does matter in a non-linear manner. The 
calculated partial derivative of the probit index with respect to number of members implies a 
maximum for an RJV of size 321 members.13 There are only two of the 913 RJVs with more 
than 320 members, one with 369 members and one with 529 members. The downturn in the 
probit index is not of interest, but rather the fact that it increases at a decreasing rate. 
 
Also, the presence of a foreign member of the RJV reduces the probability that the RJV will 
invite a U.S. university to join. Although our theoretical argument did not predict the direction of 
impact of this variable, we interpret our finding to mean that RJVs view U.S. universities and 
foreign members as substitutes for providing, at the margin, relevant knowledge for the success 
of the research endeavor, ceteris paribus. 
 
RJVs with a primary objective of product technology are less likely to include a university than 
are those with a primary objective of process technology. To the extent that product technologies 
are less dependent on the basic research expertise of university scientists than are process 
technologies, ceteris paribus, this finding is intuitive. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper addresses only one of many interesting issues related to collaborative research. In 
large part, the cause of the paucity of empirical research is the absence of readily available 
databases (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). In 2000, the National Science Foundation sponsored a 
workshop on strategic research partnerships in an effort to identify and discuss the innovation-
related implications of collaborative research and set a direction for a more systematic collection 
of information—more systematic relative to studying Federal Register filings (Jankowski et al., 
2001). NSF added a question on their 2002 survey of industrial research and development (RD-
1) specifically designed to collect information on company-funded R&D done in collaboration 
with other research partners (e.g., for-profit companies, federal laboratories, universities and 
colleges, and other non-profit organizations). As these data become available, we expect that 
researchers will go beyond exploratory empirical investigations, as in this paper, and begin to 
test many of the theoretical conclusions that scholars have formulated with regard to research 
collaboration. 
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1 Tel.: +1 603 646 2941. 
2 The University and Small Business Patent Protection Act of 1980 is commonly known as the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. For an insightful history of the Act, see Stevens (2004). See Nelson 
(2001) for a summary of various university-specific studies on patenting and the enactment of 
the Bayh-Dole Act. Therein, Nelson discusses the extent to which universities can reasonably 
take on the role of “commercial enterprises” while at the same time maintaining the traditional 
academic role. Link and Scott (2003) provide limited empirical evidence on this topic with 
respect to the impact of university involvement in science or research parks, and with respect to 
how that involvement affects the basic versus applied nature of university curricula. 
3 Combs and Link (2003) discuss the theoretical literature related to the specific policy question: 
Do research partnerships improve research efficiency? For limited empirical evidence see Link 
and Rees (1990). See also Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Scott (2003a). Scott (2003b, pp. 99–112) 
compares and contrasts findings about the efficiency of RJVs filed under the National 
Cooperative Research Act with findings about the efficiency of a particular type of cooperative 
effort – namely, cooperative efforts aimed at improving emissions performance in U.S. industry. 
4 Much of the material in this section draws directly from Link and Bauer (1989), Scott, 1988 
and Scott, 1989, Link (1996), and Brod and Link (2001). 
5 We define an RJV as a collaborative research arrangement through which firms jointly acquire 
technical knowledge. 
6 Although the work of Leyden and Link (1999) examines the economics of inviting federal 
laboratories to participate in industrial RJVs, the discussions there of the issues about 
appropriability, synergies and economies of scope, and cost are the key to understanding the 
circumstances where industrial RJV partners will invite any type of non-industrial organization 
to participate in the industrial research ventures. 
7 Although Kohn and Scott (1982) focus on the advantages of firm size for R&D activity, the 
economics of why R&D activity would increase more than proportionately with firm size is 
useful for understanding the advantages of venture size for university R&D-output contributions 
to an RJV – that is, the conditions in which university participation in an industrial RJV would 
be more likely as RJV size increases. Greater advantages of venture size for university R&D-
output contributions make it more likely that a university would be invited as a partner in the 
RJV rather than having the RJV use arms-length mechanisms to acquire university knowledge. 
Relatedly, Laursen and Salter (2004) show that the capability of manufacturing firms to draw 
from university research increases with firm size. Their arguments hold here since the RJV is a 
research organization and it should have similar objectives as the R&D areas of a firm. 
8 There has been, on average, a 2-month lag between registering the RJV with the Department of 
Justice and that registration being disclosed in the Federal Register (Brod and Link, 2001). 
9 Brod and Link (2001) have identified selected correlates with the trend in RJVs over time. In 
particular, the annual number of filings of RJVs changes, on average, in a countercyclical 
manner and in relationship to industrial development (as opposed to research) activity. 
10 We thank Nick Vonortas for suggestions in formulating these technology areas. 
11 According to Tassey (1997), p. 152, infrastructure technology, or infratechnologies “are a 
varied set of ‘technical tools’ that include measurement and test methods [and] artifacts such as 
standard reference materials that allow these methods to be used efficiently …” Link and Tassey 
(1993) provide empirical support, albeit limited, for the positive relationship between 
investments in infrastructure technology and productivity growth at the industry level. 
12 In preliminary specifications, we did not calculate robust standard errors and we did not 
correct the error terms for within year correlations. The results in those preliminary 
specifications regarding the signs and significance of the explanatory variables are essentially the 
same as those reported in the specifications of Table 2, where robust standard errors and 
correlation of errors within years are used. The probit models were estimated using StataCorp 
(2003a) as described in StataCorp (2003b), pp. 237–252). All of the probit results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
13 The coefficient on nummemb is 0.0211051 and on nummemb2 is −0.0000329. The maximum 
for the probit index is then at nummemb = 0.0211051/0.0000658. 
